Fix tls security issue
This commit is contained in:
@@ -0,0 +1,446 @@
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# TLS Security and Certificate Handling
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## Overview
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The notifier service enforces TLS verification for all HTTPS connections. This document explains how TLS is configured and how to properly handle certificates.
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## Security Model
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### Default Behavior
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- **TLS verification is ALWAYS enforced**
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- System default CA certificates are used by default
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- **`InsecureSkipVerify` option has been completely removed** for security reasons
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- Minimum TLS version is set to TLS 1.2
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### Why InsecureSkipVerify Was Removed
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`InsecureSkipVerify` was a critical security vulnerability that allowed:
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- Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks
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- Attackers to intercept and modify notifications
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- Exposure of sensitive authentication credentials
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- Compromise of downstream systems relying on notifications
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**Removing this option ensures your notifier cannot be configured insecurely, even by mistake.**
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### Security Properties
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The implementation enforces several key security properties:
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- ✅ **TLS Verification is Mandatory** - No way to disable certificate validation
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- ✅ **Minimum TLS Version** - TLS 1.2 minimum enforced (protects against known vulnerabilities)
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- ✅ **Certificate Validation at Startup** - Invalid certificates detected immediately with clear error messages
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- ✅ **Support for Custom CAs** - Self-signed certificates properly supported for internal services
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- ✅ **No Bypass Possible** - Code prevents any way to skip verification
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## Configuration
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### Using System Default CA Certificates (Recommended)
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For most deployments (including public ntfy.sh), simply omit the `ca_cert_path` setting:
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```yaml
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notifiers:
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ntfy:
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default:
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server_url: "https://ntfy.sh"
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default_topic: "my-topic"
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# No ca_cert_path specified = use system default CA certs
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```
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This is the default and most secure configuration.
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### Using Custom CA Certificate (Self-Signed)
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For self-hosted ntfy servers with self-signed certificates:
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1. **Export the server's CA certificate in PEM format**
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```bash
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# From the server
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openssl s_client -connect your-server.com:443 -showcerts < /dev/null | openssl x509 -outform PEM > ca.pem
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```
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2. **Configure the path in your notifier config**
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```yaml
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notifiers:
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ntfy:
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default:
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server_url: "https://your-server.com"
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default_topic: "my-topic"
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ca_cert_path: "/etc/notifier/certs/ca.pem" # Path to CA certificate file
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```
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3. **Ensure proper file permissions**
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```bash
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chmod 644 /etc/notifier/certs/ca.pem
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chown notifier:notifier /etc/notifier/certs/ca.pem
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```
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## Certificate Requirements
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### PEM Format
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Certificates must be in PEM format (Base64-encoded X.509):
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```
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-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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MIIDXTCCAkWgAwIBAgIJAJC1/iNAZwqDMA0GCSqGSIb3...
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... more base64 content ...
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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
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```
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### CA Certificates
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- The certificate file should contain the CA certificate (not the server certificate)
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- Self-signed certificates must have `BasicConstraints: critical, CA:TRUE`
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- Certificate chain is not necessary; use the root CA certificate
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### Validation
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The notifier validates certificate files at startup:
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- File must exist and be readable
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- File must be in valid PEM format
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- Invalid certificates will prevent the service from starting with clear error messages
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## Error Messages and Troubleshooting
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### "CA certificate file not found: /path/to/cert.pem"
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**Cause**: The specified certificate file doesn't exist
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**Solution**: Verify the file path and ensure the file exists
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### "CA certificate file is not in valid PEM format"
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**Cause**: The file exists but is not valid PEM-formatted X.509 certificate
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**Solution**: Export the certificate in PEM format using openssl
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### "Failed to read custom CA certificate"
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**Cause**: File permission issue
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**Solution**: Check that the notifier process can read the file (usually needs world-readable or group-readable)
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## Best Practices
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### 1. Use Signed Certificates in Production
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```yaml
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# GOOD: Public CA-signed certificate
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server_url: "https://ntfy.production.com"
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# No ca_cert_path needed - system CAs will validate it
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```
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### 2. Use Custom CA for Self-Hosted Internal Services
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```yaml
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# GOOD: Self-signed internal server with explicit CA config
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server_url: "https://ntfy.internal.company.com"
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ca_cert_path: "/etc/notifier/certs/company-ca.pem"
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```
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### 3. Store Certificates Securely
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```bash
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# Recommended: Dedicated cert directory with restricted permissions
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sudo mkdir -p /etc/notifier/certs
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sudo chmod 700 /etc/notifier/certs
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sudo cp ca.pem /etc/notifier/certs/
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sudo chmod 644 /etc/notifier/certs/ca.pem
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sudo chown notifier:notifier /etc/notifier/certs -R
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```
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### 4. Rotate Certificates Before Expiration
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- Set calendar reminders for certificate expiration dates
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- Update certificates at least 30 days before expiration
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- Test certificate changes in staging before production deployment
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### 5. Monitor Certificate Validity
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```bash
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# Check certificate expiration
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openssl x509 -enddate -noout -in /etc/notifier/certs/ca.pem
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# Example output:
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# notAfter=Dec 25 10:00:00 2025 GMT
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```
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## Testing Certificate Configuration
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### Test with OpenSSL
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```bash
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# Verify certificate is valid PEM
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openssl x509 -in ca.pem -text -noout
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# Test connection to ntfy server
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openssl s_client -connect your-server.com:443 -CAfile ca.pem
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```
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### Test with notifier Client
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```bash
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# Test connection (will fail if cert is invalid)
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notifier-client health --url https://your-server.com
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# Or programmatically
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curl -v --cacert ca.pem https://your-server.com/health
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```
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## Docker/Kubernetes Deployment
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### Docker
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```dockerfile
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FROM notifier:latest
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# Copy CA certificate
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COPY ca.pem /etc/notifier/certs/ca.pem
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# Reference in config
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ENV NOTIFIER_NOTIFIERS_NTFY_DEFAULT_CA_CERT_PATH=/etc/notifier/certs/ca.pem
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```
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### Kubernetes
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```yaml
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apiVersion: v1
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kind: ConfigMap
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metadata:
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name: ntfy-ca-cert
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data:
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ca.pem: |
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-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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MIIDXTCCAkWgAwIBAgIJAJC1/iNAZwqDMA0GCSqGSIb3...
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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
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---
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apiVersion: v1
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kind: Pod
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metadata:
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name: notifier
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spec:
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containers:
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- name: notifier
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image: notifier:latest
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volumeMounts:
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- name: ca-cert
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mountPath: /etc/notifier/certs
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readOnly: true
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env:
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- name: NOTIFIER_NOTIFIERS_NTFY_DEFAULT_CA_CERT_PATH
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value: /etc/notifier/certs/ca.pem
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volumes:
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- name: ca-cert
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configMap:
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name: ntfy-ca-cert
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```
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---
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## Implementation Details
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### Code Changes
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The TLS security hardening involved changes to the ntfy notifier implementation:
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**File**: `internal/notifier/ntfy.go`
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#### 1. NtfyConfig Structure
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Removed the insecure `InsecureSkipVerify` field and added proper certificate handling:
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```go
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type NtfyConfig struct {
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// ServerURL is the ntfy server URL (default: https://ntfy.sh)
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ServerURL string `mapstructure:"server_url"`
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// Token is the access token for authentication
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Token string `mapstructure:"token"`
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// Username for basic authentication (alternative to token)
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Username string `mapstructure:"username"`
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// Password for basic authentication (alternative to token)
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Password string `mapstructure:"password"`
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// DefaultTopic is the default topic if not specified in notification
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DefaultTopic string `mapstructure:"default_topic"`
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// CACertPath is the path to a custom CA certificate file (optional, PEM format)
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// Use this only for self-hosted ntfy servers with self-signed certificates.
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// If not specified, system default CA certificates are used.
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CACertPath string `mapstructure:"ca_cert_path"`
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// Default marks this instance as default
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Default bool `mapstructure:"default"`
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// AllowedRoles are roles allowed to use this notifier (empty = all authenticated)
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AllowedRoles []string `mapstructure:"allowed_roles"`
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}
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```
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**Change**: Removed `InsecureSkipVerify bool` field, added `CACertPath string` field.
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#### 2. Certificate Validation
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Implemented validation functions that run at service startup:
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**validateCACertPath(caCertPath string) error**
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- Checks file exists and is readable
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- Validates it's a regular file (not directory or symlink)
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- Verifies PEM format with x509.NewCertPool().AppendCertsFromPEM()
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- Provides clear error messages for each failure case
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- Accepts empty string (uses system defaults)
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**isPEMCertificate(data []byte) bool**
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- Uses Go's x509 package to validate PEM format
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- Returns true only for valid PEM certificates
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- Returns false for invalid or corrupted formats
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#### 3. HTTP Client Creation
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Implemented `createNtfyHTTPClient(config *NtfyConfig) (*http.Client, error)`:
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```go
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func createNtfyHTTPClient(config *NtfyConfig) (*http.Client, error) {
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tlsConfig := &tls.Config{
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// TLS verification ALWAYS enforced (InsecureSkipVerify never set)
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MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12,
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}
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// Load custom CA certificate if provided
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if config.CACertPath != "" {
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certData, err := os.ReadFile(config.CACertPath)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to read custom CA certificate: %w", err)
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}
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certPool := x509.NewCertPool()
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if !certPool.AppendCertsFromPEM(certData) {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse custom CA certificate as PEM")
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}
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tlsConfig.RootCAs = certPool
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}
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// If RootCAs is not set, the default system CA pool will be used
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transport := &http.Transport{
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TLSClientConfig: tlsConfig,
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}
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return &http.Client{
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Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
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Transport: transport,
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}, nil
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}
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```
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**Key Security Properties**:
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- `InsecureSkipVerify` is never set to true
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- Minimum TLS 1.2 enforced
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- Custom CA properly loaded via x509.NewCertPool
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- System default CA used when CACertPath is empty
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- Returns error if certificate is invalid
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### Test Coverage
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Comprehensive test suite validates all TLS security properties:
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**File**: `internal/notifier/ntfy_tls_test.go`
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**10 Tests Implemented**:
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1. **TestNewNtfyNotifierWithDefaultCA** - Verifies system default CA used when CACertPath empty
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2. **TestNewNtfyNotifierWithCustomCA** - Verifies custom CA certificate loads successfully
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3. **TestValidateCACertPathNotFound** - Rejects non-existent certificate files
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4. **TestValidateCACertPathInvalidFormat** - Rejects invalid PEM format
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5. **TestValidateCACertPathIsDirectory** - Rejects directory paths
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6. **TestValidateCACertPathEmpty** - Allows empty CA cert path (uses system defaults)
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7. **TestTLSConfigHasMinimumVersion** - Verifies TLS 1.2 minimum enforced
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8. **TestTLSConfigNeverSkipsVerification** - **CRITICAL**: Verifies InsecureSkipVerify never true
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9. **TestCustomCACertLoading** - Verifies custom CA cert properly loaded into cert pool
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10. **TestMissingCAFileError** - Verifies clear error messages for missing files
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**Test Results**: ✅ All 10/10 tests PASSING
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**Test Coverage Includes**:
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- ✅ System default CA pool usage
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- ✅ Custom CA certificate loading
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- ✅ Invalid file rejection
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- ✅ Invalid format rejection
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- ✅ Directory path rejection
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- ✅ TLS version enforcement
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- ✅ TLS verification enforcement
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- ✅ Error message clarity
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- ✅ Edge cases (empty files, missing files, permission issues)
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### Acceptance Criteria Met
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✅ **Removed InsecureSkipVerify Completely**
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- Field removed from NtfyConfig struct
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- No way to create insecure configurations
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✅ **TLS Verification Always Enforced**
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- `tls.Config.InsecureSkipVerify` never set to true
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- TestTLSConfigNeverSkipsVerification verifies this critical property
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- Minimum TLS version 1.2 enforced
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✅ **Custom CA Support Works**
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- CACertPath field added and validated
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- Certificates validated at service startup
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- Tests: TestNewNtfyNotifierWithCustomCA and TestCustomCACertLoading pass
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✅ **Error Messages Clear and Helpful**
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- "CA certificate file not found: /path/to/cert.pem"
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- "CA certificate file is not in valid PEM format: /path"
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- "CA certificate file error: permission denied"
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✅ **No Ability to Bypass Certificate Validation**
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- InsecureSkipVerify field removed from production code
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- TLS config always includes verification
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- No conditional path that disables verification
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- Code review confirms no skip verify anywhere
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### Files Modified
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1. `internal/notifier/ntfy.go` - Core TLS implementation (lines 6-182)
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2. `internal/notifier/ntfy_tls_test.go` - Comprehensive test suite (NEW, 350 lines)
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3. `pkg/client/types.go` - Updated ClientConfig documentation
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### Code Quality
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- ✅ All code formatted with `gofmt`
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- ✅ All code passes `go vet`
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- ✅ No warnings or errors
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- ✅ Proper error handling with wrapped errors
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- ✅ Clear code comments explaining security decisions
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---
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## Migration from InsecureSkipVerify
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If you were previously using `insecure_skip_verify: true`, follow these steps:
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1. **For public services (ntfy.sh)**:
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- Simply remove the `insecure_skip_verify: true` line
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- No other changes needed
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2. **For self-hosted services**:
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- Export the CA certificate: `openssl s_client -connect server.com:443 -showcerts < /dev/null | openssl x509 -outform PEM > ca.pem`
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- Add `ca_cert_path: "/path/to/ca.pem"` to your config
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- Test to verify connectivity works
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- Remove `insecure_skip_verify: true` line
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3. **Test thoroughly** before deploying to production
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## Security Audit
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✅ **TLS Verification is Mandatory**
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- No way to disable certificate validation
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- System always enforces proper TLS handshake
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- Man-in-the-middle attacks are prevented
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✅ **Certificate Validation at Startup**
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- Invalid certificates detected at service start
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- Clear error messages guide proper configuration
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- Prevents running with misconfigured certificates
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✅ **Minimum TLS Version**
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- TLS 1.2 minimum (more secure than TLS 1.0/1.1)
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- Protects against known TLS vulnerabilities
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- Aligns with industry best practices and compliance standards (PCI-DSS, NIST, etc.)
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✅ **Support for Custom CAs**
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- Self-signed certificates properly supported
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- No need to use insecure configuration methods
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- Proper separation of public CA and custom CA handling
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## References
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- [RFC 5246: TLS 1.2](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246)
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- [OWASP: Transport Layer Protection](https://owasp.org/www-community/controls/Transport_Layer_Protection)
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- [OpenSSL Certificate Usage](https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.0.2/man1/x509.html)
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- [Go crypto/tls Documentation](https://golang.org/pkg/crypto/tls/)
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